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Introduction 
This study is about the United States and 
Europe. It aims to examine the American 
effort to transform Europe into a more 
efficient military actor, along U.S. 
imperatives. Over the past decade, this has 
become a continuously recurring theme, 
stirring new initiatives, reforms and 
emotions on both sides of the Atlantic. To 
cast new light over the discrepancy 
between U.S. and European armament, this 
study will explore the strategic 
fundamentals for the United States' effort 
to get European forces "up and go". The 
case used to illustrate the American effort 
is the Clinton Administration's De(e~tce 
Capabilities Initiative (DC!), launched at 
NATO's Washington Summit in 1999. The 
case may also illustrate the more 
fundamental aspects of the relationship: 
How does the United States perceive the 
European defence effort today, and how 
may the European approach be adjusted to 
U.S. preferences? Exploring the logic and 
intent behind the DC! may also provide us 
with more knowledge regarding the 
transatlantic tension that has been aroused 
since "9.11". 
Three questions will structure our 
analysis. First, the basic question, what 
was the U.S. ratio~tale for launching the 
DC!? Second, how does the United States 
want European NATO members to 
transform their military forces; and third, 
what is, from a U.S. perspective, the 
expectation of the European 
transformation' The questions allow us to 
explore the U.S. policy in two broad issues. 
First, with respect to political processes in 
NATO, and the fact that the United States 
uses the DC! as a means of influencing 
European politics. Secondly, in terms of 
increased Atlantic integration, by means of 
military transformation. 
Three lines of arguments that relate to 
the questions above will be presented. First, 
it will be argued that the U.S. wants to 
maintain influence in Europe through 
NATO, and that a more efficient Alliance 
can take part in projecting global stability 
through non-Article V peace support 
missions. Secondly, I will argue that in 
order to ensure NATO relevancy, the 
United States wants Europe to spend 
scarce defence resources more effectively. 
Joint, common and multinational funding 
of key capabilities is encouraged to get 
European forces off their own Continent. 
Thirdly, the U.S. objective is the creation of 
multinational European expeditionary 
forces that are closely integrated and 
interoperable with U.S. forces. 
What is the U.S. Rationale for 
Transforming the European Armed 
Forces? 
Why did United States' Secretary of 
Defense, William S. Cohen introduce the 
idea of focused improvement of defence 
capabilities to his NATO counterparts in 
June 1998? After all, the State Department 
had since 1992 pursued a strategy of 
"change is better" towards Europe, 
pushing the 'Old Continent' towards 
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increased engagement out-of-area (OOA). 1 
It should not come as a surprise that the 
Secretary's observations at the time relied 
heavily on NATO's Implementation Force 
(!FOR) and Stabilisation Force (SFOR) 
experiences in Bosnia. Between 1995 and 
1998, the Alliance had experienced grave 
operational deficiencies in fields such as 
strategic mobility, effective and secure 
communication, as well as operational 
sustainability.2 Little European experience 
in timely and swift power projection that 
could be sustained over time became 
unacceptable impediments to mission 
success. As Senior Policy Advisor John Lis 
at the House International Relations 
Committee pointed out, "This was even so 
when operations took place on Europe's 
own Continent, just outside their territorial 
borders". 3 It was therefore acknowledged, 
both in Washington and in Europe, that 
future conflicts on the Continent most 
likely would place a premium on the ability 
to deploy troops and equipment to crises 
rapidly. This would also, more often than 
not, be outside NATO territory. But more 
importantly, the operations would also be 
pursued with little or no pre-existing host 
nation support:' 
This lesson was also consistent with the 
United States' leading intellectual 
guideline, joi11t Visio11 2010: "Power 
projection, enabled by overseas presence, 
will likely remain the strategic fundamental 
strategic concept of our future". 5 The 
ability to react swiftly on short notice, 
before the enemy dispersed or reorganised 
into looser formations that were hard to 
locate and attack, became paramount to 
mission success. 
This acknowledgement was again 
emphasised when Secretary Cohen hosted 
more than 60 NATO representatives to a 
NATO Transformation Conference in 
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Norfolk, Virginia, five months later: 
our e:rperience in Bosnia [. .. }revealed that NATO 's 
transformation from a fixed, positiona/ defense to a 
flexible, mobile defense is incomplete. Indeed, /FOR 
and SFOR suggest that should we be forced to 
operate outside Alliance territory in the fit lure, we 
should expect to do so without pre-existing 
communication, logistics, headquarters, or other 
infrastructure. 6 
The U.S. rationale to stimulate a European 
capability improvement for operations 
outside NATO territory became even more 
evident the year after. As NATO's air 
campaign Operatioll Allied Force was 
launched in Kosovo in March 1999, serious 
deficiencies among the European forces 
were exposed. The reason, as most 
Americans saw it, was due to the fact that 
the operations were launched outside their 
partner's prearranged theatres. As new 
challenges emerged, NATO's first war 
thereby demonstrated the need to improve 
the European Allies' military capabilities. 
Secretary Cohen and Chairman of the U.S. 
Joint Chiefs, General Henry H. Shelton, 
urgently pointed out before the Senate 
Armed Services Committee the 
requirement for major capability 
improvements in Europe: 
Disparities in capabilities ·will serious~v affect our 
ability to operate as an effective Alliance over the 
long term. ({the Alliance is to meet the future 
military challenges effective~v, it must successfully 
implement the Defense Capabilities initiative which 
we imroduced to our Alliance counterpart.'.'.· 
The Assistant Secretary of Defense, 
Franklin D. Kramer, also confirmed the 
necessity for a European boost of their 
defence efforts. In his testimony to the 
Senate Foreign Relation Committee, 
Kramer pointed out that "while our Nato 
partners contributed significantly to the 
military capabilities employed in Operation 
ALLIED FORCE, the operation highlighted 
a number of disparities between U.S. 
capabilities and those of our Allies".' The 
gaps, particularly in mobility, precision 
strike, command, control and 
communications capabilities were real, and 
they had the effect of "impeding our ability 
to operate at optimal effectiveness with our 
Nato Allies" .9 Moreover, as the U.S. 
Department of Defense claimed in their 
strategy Strengthening Transatlantic 
Security, a European lack of air mobility 
severely slowed the build-up of the Kosovo 
Implementation Force (KFOR), which was 
led by NATO after the air campaign 
ended. 10 
According to Senior Advisor at The 
Center for Strategic and International 
Studies (CSIS) Michele A. Flournoy, getting 
Europe to acquire the right capabilities 
would therefore substantiate the United 
States' strategic vision for a post-Cold War 
Alliance: To keep NATO as relevant as 
possible by providing military teeth and 
strategic punch." This was also echoed 
from the State Department officials: 
even though there is some discrepanc_v between 
Pentagon and State Department of how Europe 
should respond to the IWH' threats, we would both 
appreciate European allies that could deal with the 
new threats in a more comprehensive manner. 12 
This would again provide the United States 
with an Alliance willing and able to 
address the challenges of the 21" Century, 
in particular the nexus between 
international terrorism, proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and 
rogue states. 13 
However, the division of labour that the 
United States experienced in Operation 
Allied Force may at the time have been 
militarily necessary, but politically 
unhealthy to the transatlantic relationship. 
Without more European military punch, 
the Alliance would most likely become a 
looser security. Both professor Richard L. 
Kugler and professor Hans Binnendijk, two 
of the main architects behind the DC! and 
the NATO Response Force, claimed that 
"such a weakened alliance will not interest 
the United States" .14 On the contrary, as 
Chairman of the United States Senate 
Foreign Relation Committee Senator 
Richard G. Lugar puts it, "the legacy of 
Kosovo has reinforced the concern that 
NATO is not up to the job of fighting a 
modern war" .15 This call seems to be a 
bipartisan issue. Former Director on 
NATO Policy at the Office of the Secretary 
of Defense (OSD) between 2000 and 2002, 
Leo Michel, argued that in the past, the 
U.S. had been willing to cover Alliance 
capability shortfalls unilaterally. This could 
be less true in the future. Eventually, the 
capabilities gap could call into question the 
underlying cohesion of the Alliance." 
Similar sentiments were also echoed from 
the Senate. Senior policy advisor to 
Senator Joseph R. Biden, Michael Holtzel 
claimed that "since we share the same 
values and wishes, we should also share 
the burden. If there is no reciprocity, the 
Alliance will gradually wither"." The 
Pentagon therefore claimed that 
a greater European military capabilities will make 
the Alliance stronger, lift some of the burden the 
United States now has to carry in eve/)1 crisis, and 
make the U.S.-European relationship a mare 
balanced partnership. 18 
\Ve may therefore argue that the lessons 
learned from Kosovo in 1999 validated the 
capability improvements sought by the 
United States from 1998. As Pentagon's 
strategy Strengthening Transatlantic 
Security pointed out: "The need for 
effective implementation of the DCI was 
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underscored by NATO's experience in 
Operation Allied Force, which was 
underway during the Washington 
Summit" .19 The difficulties for Europeans 
to generate and sustain forces on their own 
continent may as such have provided the 
United States and Europe with a stronger 
incentive to take action to improve 
European capabilities in the five core 
areas: deployability and mobility; 
sustainability and logistics; command, 
control and communication (C3); effective 
engagement; and survivability of forces 
and infrastructure. 20 
To what extent was this rationale for 
transformation shared across the Atlantic? 
As former Assistant Secretary of State 
Ronald D. Asmus points out, the will to 
transform European forces should nor be 
exaggerated: "Every time we went to 
Europe to talk about new missions for 
NATO, in particular 'out-of-area', you 
were always in the cautious corner -
probably out of fear that Article V would 
be less valued". 21 This was particularly so 
for the smaller members, and those on the 
Southern and Northern flank. Well into the 
1990s, they were still chilled by the fact 
that collective security commitments, as 
enshrined in Article V of the Washington 
Treaty, would be impaired, and that U.S. 
focus would turn elsewhere." In other 
words, force requirements for our-of-area 
operations were assessed through the 
prisms of the different nations. 
To ensure that NATO remained relevant 
in a new era, and thus maintclin momentum 
in the emerging European transformation 
process, a focal point for the Pentagon and 
State Department was to manifest Article 
IV operations as much as Article V 
operations in the New Strategic Concept 
from 1999. To convince pro-Arlantic 
members in Europe, a "Small Country 
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Strategy" rowards Norway, Denmark and 
the Netherlands was therefore launched 
from the State Department." The aim was 
to convince them that Article V would be 
sustained, even though NATO took on a 
bigger role outside their OOA.24 Europe's 
larger states, in particular France and 
Germany were harder to persuade, "by 
size and culture, they were too sovereign, 
and tended to act more independently in 
the transformation process towards Article 
IV operations". 25 
In the end therefore, the DC! became a 
programmatic expression of the New 
Strategic Concept - a compromise between 
the United States and her sceptical Allies in 
Europe. Force projection could take place, 
bur not too far out; only in and around 
Europe.26 In the U.S. State Department, the 
slogan "Let's do Kosovo again, bur better 
next time" finally convinced many 
Europeans, among them Norway, that 
force transformation for operations on the 
European continent was the right way ro 
go. 
What was so fundamentally wrong with 
the European force structure? According to 
professor Richard L Kugler at the 
National Defense University (NDU), the 
European capabilities were primarily 
designed for border defence. In total, the 
European NATO members held more 
ground divisions and strike aircraft than 
possessed by the United States." However, 
they only possessed ten per cent of the U.S. 
capacity to swiftly project military power 
to long distances for strike operations." 
This was also confirmed within NATO's 
military headquarters at SHAPE; Europe 
had only 11 pieces of strategic airlift while 
the U.S. had 240.29 Also, the retention of 
large conscript armies made the European 
Armed Forces unable to deploy rapidly in 
highly specialised operations that the U.S. 
utilised in her modern \Varfare concepts.30 
The notorious decline in most European 
defence budgets made these challenges 
more precanous. 
Senior U.S. officials in the last Clinton 
Administration also confirm this, 
recognizing the strained transatlantic 
processes after Kosovo. As former 
Assistant Secretary of Defense Franklin D. 
Kramer put it: "Both we and our European 
Allies recognize that one of the lessons of 
Kosovo is that NATO's European pillar 
needs to do a better job in acquiring and 
maintaining the type of capabilities 
Operation Allied Force required". 31 If 
NATO was to continue as a prosperous 
organisation in the 21" century, the 
European force structure had to get "up 
and go". 32 One of the key elements in the 
last Clinton Administration's defence 
strategy therefore became "to prepare now 
for an uncertain future through focused 
modernization efforts". 33 
It may clearly be argued that this 
imperative became more conspicuous with 
the inauguration of a new Administration, 
and with the terrorist attacks on September 
11, 200l. As The National Security 
Strategy of the United States vigorously 
points out, 
The allack.s of September 11 were also an attack on 
NATO[. . .] NATO must build a capability to field at 
short notice, highly mobile, specially trained forces 
whenever they are needed to respond to a threat 
against any member of the alliance. J.J 
As such, NATO's response, by invoking 
Article V, opened up a Pandora's box. Most 
European Allies came to support in 
principle the U.S.-led transformation and 
the new conceptual requirements. To 
Europe, this implied an renewed U.S. 
emphasis on the Alliance' ability to 
transform towards international terrorism, 
weapons of mass destruction, and their 
proliferators and harbours.35 
On Force Transformation: How Should 
Europe Proceed? 
In 1999, the European Allies possessed 
over 1.4 million troops, but were hard 
pressed to maintain about 50,000 of them 
in the Balkans.36 As SHAPE pointed out, 
only 250.000 of the 1.4 million European 
troops were deployableY According to 
U.S. officials, both in the Pentagon and the 
State Department, this would imply less 
interoperability across the Atlantic. This 
would again provide Europe with less 
leverage on decisions and decision-making 
processes (i.e. targeting procedures), and 
ultimately fewer obstacles towards a U.S. 
unilateral approach." The key towards 
modernisation was to spend scarce 
resources in new ways. This was 
particularly emphasised by force planners 
in the Pentagon. According to the 
Pentagon's strategy for transatlantic 
security, a disappointingly small number of 
Force Goals had been implemented.39 As 
Clinton's last Administration pointed out, 
many Allies were heading in the wrong 
direction, "either seriously considering or 
carrying out real reductions in defence 
spending. This trend will have to be 
reversed" .40 The U.S. disappointment with 
the European armed forces seems to have 
been bipartisan, regardless of the 
administration's political flavour. As the 
republican Bush Administration entered 
office in 2001, Douglas J. Feith, Under 
Secretary of Defense for Policy expressed: 
H-'e heard encouraging rhetoric at the 1999 
JVashington Summit, but by-and-large have seen 
meagre results. [. . .]As 1ve encourage allies to 
spend more on defense, it is even more important 
that we get them to "spend smarter. .JI 
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Similar sentiments were also echoed from 
the Congress. All of the political bodies 
emphasised the European unwillingness to 
spend their resources more generously, and 
more efficiently." 
As the United States did not turn to 
NATO when Operation Enduring Freedom 
was launched in October 2001, Chairman 
of the United States Senate Foreign 
Relation Committee, Senator Richard G. 
Lugar, explained that 
Some Americans have lost confidence in the 
Alliance. Years of cuts in defense spending and 
failure to meet pledge after pledge to improve 
Europea11 military capabilities has left some 
Americans with doubt as to what our allies could 
realistical(v contribute. [. . .} The U.S. did hm•e 
cmifidence in a selected group of individual allies. 
But it did not have confidence in the institution that 
is NATO." 
Similar sentiments were also echoed from 
NATO's Secretary General Lord 
Robertson: "For all the political energy 
expended in NATO to implement the 
Defence Capabilities Initiative, [ ... ] the 
truth is that mighty Europe remains a 
military pygmy" .44 As we have already 
noted, this was evident during NATO's 
Operation Allied Force in Kosovo in 
1999.'5 Operation Enduring Freedom in 
Afghanistan in October 2001, may have 
been the culminating point: this was the 
first time since the end of the Cold War 
that U.S. forces conducted a major military 
operation that directly affected Europe's 
safety, without NATO or any European 
country playing a major role. As Hans 
Binnendijk pointed out, the United States 
declined help from NATO because Europe 
was unable to contribute to the kind of hi-
tech, intelligence-based war that was 
ultimately fought." This is also confirmed 
among staffers in the Congress: "Our 
European NATO allies offered no option to 
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fight in Afghanistan - they could not help 
U.S. forces on the ground" _47 
We may add that many Europeans may 
fall further behind as the United States 
added another 48 billion U.S. dollars to her 
defence budget in 2003, with more to 
follow. This amount alone constitutes 150 
per cent of the total defence spending of 
the United Kingdom or France, the largest 
NATO member states defence budgets 
after the United States. However, as Senior 
Research Fellow at the NDU, Jeffrey 
Simon pointed out, that may nonetheless 
increase the pressure on Europe to re-
examine their defence resources and what 
they are spent on. 48 In that context, 
NATO's Secretary General Lord Robertson 
has urgently pointed out that 
American critics ofnon-American military' 
incapabili(v are right. If Europe is to play its proper 
part in NATO,[. .. ] all European countries must 
show a neH' willingness to develop effective crisis 
management capabilities . .J 9 
How then, should Europe live up to the 
standard of the United States in terms of 
efficient spending? Following Kramer's 
testimony to the Senate Foreign Relation 
Committee, it may be argued that a 
successful transformation of European 
Armed Forces relied upon both a provision 
of sufficient resources, and more effective 
spending: 
Allies need to show leadership in making the 
necessary~ investments to field a 2 / 1., century force. 
Defense budgets will always be a fimction of 
national priorities, but the.v must also he a fimctiun 
of both international challenges and the 
capabilities needed to address those challenges as 
an Alliance. [. .. ] While Allies acknowledge their 
capability shortfalls, few have made concrete efforts 
fOH'ards their amelioration by increasing their 
defi:mse budgets and relocating funds. In fact, 
defense spending has been cut by several key 
.4llies. 50 
Acknowledging the fact that several 
Allies were less willing to increase their 
defence budgets, aspects of affordability 
became a primary incentive to convince 
hesitant Europeans. For instance, resources 
for out-of-area operations could be found 
through restructuring and making 
reductions in military personnel, in 
particular among those states that still 
maintained a large conscript system. 
Capabilities related to logistics and 
mobility could be met by commercially 
available assets and off-the-shelf 
technology, "for example, by harnessing 
commercial transport assets in an 
emergency for military airlift or sealift 
support" _5I As one of the architects behind 
the DCJ, Professor Richard L. Kugler at 
the NDU bluntly put it, "as a matter of 
fact, 'doing more with less' was the main 
criteria in the DCI process to get Europe 
moving" .52 In that way, the European 
NATO members could use the DCI as a 
n1eans to configure and transform a 
portion of their forces. By following the 
American advice, Europe could be guided 
towards new concepts, including swift 
power projection and hi-tech strike 
operations together with U.S. forces. 
Making the procurement of defence 
equipment faster, cheaper and better, a 
closer integration across national borders 
is required. Wise investments could thereby 
take advantage of NATO's multinational 
structures to produce and field equipment 
that is genuinely interoperable. 
The prescription of 'doing more with less' 
as a way to transform static European 
forces may thus have been a vi tal issue for 
Lord George Robertson as he was 
appointed NATO's tenth Secretary General 
in October 1999. In his remarks to the 
Parliamentary Assembly in Amsterdam the 
next month, he stated that 
[. .. ]the European members ufNATO spend almost 
two-thirds of the United States' defence budget-
but Kosovo made it clear that that they have 
nothing like two-thirds of the real capability qf the 
US. In other words, it is not simp~v a question of 
spending more though some of us will have to - it is 
about spending more wisely 53 
It may therefore be claimed that the idea of 
spending resources more wisely is 
consistent with leading Pentagon officials, 
both at the political and at the official 
working level. Everyone endorsed an even 
closer specialisation and differentiation 
among the European Allies. As Principal 
Director Jim J. Townsend at the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense (OSD) points out, 
too many European governments wasted 
what they spend on capabilities that 
contribute nothing to their own security, 
the security of Europe or wider collective 
• 54 f h mterests. I t e imbalance between the 
United States and Europe should be 
rectified, the burden of dealing with 
European security crises should therefore 
from a U.S. viewpoint, not fall ' 
disproportionately on the shoulders of the 
US. 
From a U.S. perspective therefore, it may 
clearly be argued that through increased 
emphasis on niche capabilities, a more 
balanced Alliance with a stronger 
European contribution could be facilitated. 
Following Kramer's testimony to the 
Senate Foreign Relation Committee: 
Nations need not respond to the lessons of the 
Balkans in the same way- there is no "one size fits 
for all" solution to increasing national and 
Alliance capabilities. While not all Allies must 
develop equal capabilities, the collective goal 
should be compatible capabilities-" 
A European refocusing of defence efforts 
would therefore only provide substance if 
the Allies tuned down the territorial 
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imperative in rheir defence planning. 
Following Lord Robertson, "[l]n today's 
world, we need fewer unusable conscripts. 
Smaller heavy metal armies. Fewer static 
bases. And fewer static headquarters" .56 
Instead, more focus should be on 
multinational, joint and common funding of 
key capabilities. A European pooling of 
resources, by establishing a number of 
multinational consortiums aimed at 
acquiring key capabilities, would allow 
NATO to operate more quickly and 
flexibly wherever needed. In particular, 
strategic sea and airlift, air-to-air 
refuelling, precision guided munitions 
(PGMs), and advanced communications 
would be of critical importance if Europe 
should be "up and go" according to U.S. 
standards. As the Pentagon's strategy 
Strengthening Transatlantic Security points 
out, "[j]oint procurement of certain defence 
equipment and technology by a group of 
Allies is [a] promising approach, which the 
United States will continue to support" .57 
These requirements, it could be claimed, 
would again stimulate the European NATO 
Allies' demand for a more focused, efficient 
and coordinated use of increasingly scarce 
resources. These sentiments were also 
echoed in the Senate. As Senior Foreign 
Policy Advisor Michael Haltzel pointed 
out, "the states in Eastern Europe are 
smart; they're trying to specialize in what 
others don't have. Lithuania has state-of 
the-art in underwater demolition -we need 
that! "58 In particular, professor Kugler 
explicitly formulated the argument that 
Europe did not have the right focus, and 
was too deeply stuck into national 
priorities: 
Todav:r European militaries are larger and stronger 
than-is common(v realised, with 1,4 million active-
duty troops and 160 billion dollars in defence 
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spending. But because they still focus Oil defending 
their borders, they lack the capacity to project 
power to long distances, where the new threats 
reside. 59 
In trying to influence Europeans to spend 
money on new capabilities that are 
consistent with U.S. preferences, NATO 
stands forth as the primary U.S. 
instrument. As the Head of the European 
Section of Intelligence in State Department 
Bowman Miller put it, "the United States 
will lead the response in the security arena, 
but it cannot carry the weight alone. A 
more efficient and rational use of European 
defence resources through NATO is thus 
required" .60 From such a perspective, 
European Armed Forces need to 
concentrate on a few capabilities such as 
sensors, secure data links, all-weather 
precision strikes and improved logistics. 
However, this task requires a concerted 
effort of the sort not yet launched." 
Pentagon officials, both in the last 
Clinton Administration and in the present 
Bush Administration, agreed to these 
statements, noting that "the problem is not 
how much is spent, but what it is spent 
on". 62 According to Kramer, complaints 
from Europe that the DC! was far too 
costly were therefore dismissed. After all, it 
was only a matter of reorganising existing 
resources. However, this required political 
will, dedication and leadership: "We never 
expected Norway to have a full spectrum 
capacity- only a few". 63 This view was 
also echoed in the U.S. Department of 
Defense. In Strengthening Transatlantic 
Securit)', the last Clinton Administration 
stated that 
Our goal is not to develop similar capabilities for 
eve!}' NATO membe1; since not evelJ' member needr; 
or can afford the neu•est or the best fighter aircraft, 
long-range tanker or surveillance ,\:·vstems. Rathe1; 
our goal is to provide NATO forces with cumputible 
and complementary capabilities that meet our 
collective requirements. 6-1 
As not every member had to possess or buy 
the newest or best equipment of all types, a 
U.S. argument would be that Europe 
should instead look into radically 
restructuring existing forces. We could also 
add that emphasis should be put on those 
segments within the Armed Forces where 
any substantial contribution to the Alliance 
could be made, as NATO gradually moved 
beyond its own territory. As professor 
Hans Bennendijk at the NDU pointed out, 
"European militaries need to concentrate 
on a few key capabilities such as sensors 
' 
PGM and improved logistics"." In that 
respect, it has been argued that it is not 
only imperative that nations maintain 
sufficient defence spending, but also that 
they realise the full potential of the 
resources they already spend. Following 
Kramer, "any different approach would 
mean an unnecessary duplication, if not 
competition, and would be wasteful at best 
and divisive at worst"." As Senior Advisor 
to U.S. Congressman Jerry Lewis, Car! M. 
Kime put it, "[the Europeans] have a 
choice to spend more effectively- in the 
end, it boils down to the political will of 
maintaining their own security" _67 
Force Transformation and its Conceptual 
Implications- What arc the U.S. 
Expectations? 
Having used the Balkan and the 
Afghanistan experience as a contextual 
background, what are the United States' 
expectations for a militarily more potent 
Europe? How can a gap in military 
capabilities be bridged if a transatlantic 
political division is to be avoided? In other 
words, what military concept does the 
United States envisage for her European 
Allies, as threats arise less from conquering 
states than from failing ones, often far off 
'the Old Continent'? 
The U.S. military performance in Kosovo 
and Afghanistan, and the subsequent 
disappointment over Europe, gave new 
impetus to U.S. policy makers: To forge a 
European expeditionary force structure 
sooner than later." Even though the notion 
"expeditionary" for years had made many 
Europeans wary, in particular those 
without a colonial past, the two conflicts 
accelerated and matured the expeditionary 
force concept in Europe, thus making the 
U.S. arguments more valid. In particular, 
we may claim that President George W. 
Bush's September 2001 call to arms against 
terrorism, and NATO's unprecedented 
Article 5 declaration, made the U.S. 
expectations more explicit: Europe had to 
field expeditionary units that could respond 
effectively together with the U.S. in austere 
areas far beyond NATO territory." This 
was again reiterated as the President 
visited the German Bundestag in May 
2002: 
Dangers originating far from Europe can now strike 
at Europe :f heart -so NATO must be able and 
willing to act whenever threats emerge. This will 
require all the assets of modern defense- mobile 
and deployable forces. sophisticated special 
opera.tions, the ability to jight under the threat of 
chenucal and biological weapons. ~0 
Pressure towards a more global role for 
European countries was also evident in The 
National Secztrity Strategy of the United 
States, which was released one year after 
the terrorist attacks: "The alliance must be 
able to act wherever our interests are 
threatened" .71 As Captain Sa m]. Tangredi 
at the Institute for National Strategic 
Studies (INSS) at the NDU described it 
' 
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after September 11, the European allies 
suddenly found themselves in a "come-as-
you-are" war, in which only the most 
capable, interoperable forces -a few units 
from the United Kingdom- were able to 
contribute.72 These tendencies were also 
evident in Kosovo in 1999, but accelerated 
dramatically after the spectacular terrorist 
attacks on the United States. Subsequently, 
NATO defence ministers issued three 
communiques in June 2002, calling for 
improved military capabilities for new 
missions, including exacting operations 
outside Europe.73 In the United States 
however, many Americans still complained 
that the Europeans were perpetual free 
riders; if NATO were to prosper in the 21" 
century, U.S. requirements would have to 
be met. However, what would the U.S. 
expect from Europe? 
Two of the architects behind the DC!, 
Professor Hans Binnendijk and Professor 
Richard L. Kugler at the NDU in 
Washington, claimed that the European 
allies needed a real power projection 
capability to get off the Continent. This 
should primarily be designed for globally 
"forced entry missions" -that is the higher 
end of the conflict spectre. The EU would 
anyway emphasise the lower end, the so-
called Sr. Petersberg tasks.74 An 
expeditionary force concept would, 
according to the two, also provide Europe 
with what they most needed: A U.S. 
leadership role for a more focused 
transformation towards out-of-area 
operations.75 Since the end of the Cold War, 
the United States and her NATO Allies had 
pursued divergent attitudes towards 
purchasing key capabilities. This was 
particularly so in the application of 
innovative information technology, a 
development that in the United States was 
seen as a major part of a Revolution in 
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Military Affairs ( RMA). Most allies were 
unable to contribute with sophisticated 
capabilities outside their national borders. 
As professor Roy W. Stafford at the 
National War College pointed out, the 
Europeans had chosen to forego investment 
in modern technologies and systems in 
favour of reduced spending and continued 
reliance on aging border-defence systems.'' 
Therefore, from a U.S. viewpoint, the 
United States had to play a more active 
role if European conceptual thinking should 
pay due regard to more mobile and 
deployable forces. According to Professor 
Binnendijk, "if the U.S. stood back and 
waited for Europe to make it themselves, 
the results would not have met U.S. 
requirements" .77 If not, the European allies 
would continue to hook up untrained 
multinational forces rather than draw upon 
an integrated and flexible force that 
already existed.'" 
To address the new security environment 
adequately, future operations would be 
joint, dispersed, simultaneous, high tempo 
and deep-striking, employing modern 
platforms and smart munitions. From a 
U.S. perspective, European forces should 
therefore be expected to field a standing 
expeditionary hi-tech force consisting of 
the following DCI-related components: 
,,. Ground Forces: A reinforced brigade-sized 
task force; a Special Operation group of 
about 200 personnel; Attack helicopter task 
forces; Reconnaisance, Surveillance and 
Target Acquisution Company; Engineer 
Company; Chemical Detachment; Logistics; 
Military Police Company; Communication 
Unit; Medical Company; 
,. Air Forces: A reinforced composite 
tactical fighter wing, including tankers; 
Suppression of Enemy Air Defence; Air 
Ground Surveillance; AWACS and 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles for 
reconnaissance, surveillance and targeting 
acquisition; 
'' Naval Forces: A flotilla of six to eight 
combat ships with precision cruise missiles 
firing submarines; One underway 
replenishment group; Mine 
Countermeasure Capability 
(approximately three ships).79 
In this context, the European NATO 
members would have to reallocate about 
two per cent of their total defence 
spending, or increase spending by two 
per cent, in order to develop and 
maintain a deployable force.' 0 We may 
argue that U.S. expectations were high 
on behalf of her European allies, mostly 
because the conceptual expectation was 
affordable. As Binnendijk and Kugler 
pointed out, the Europeans do not need 
large forces, as most conflicts would 
require only "small-to-medium sized 
strike packages. The Europeans need 
only enough new-era forces to provide 
credible participation in crises".' 1 
Professor Stuart E. Johnson at the NDU 
also reiterated these rather moderate 
ambitions: "If Europe is to field new-era 
forces into an expeditionary force 
structure, it has to be made at an 
affordable cost"." The forces should be 
assembled primarily from national units 
in Naro High Readiness Force (HRF). In 
rh at respect, a number of NATO 
countries already possess key platforms 
in their inventory, or in their procurement 
programs. As professor Binnendijk 
pointed out, these would be more than 
adequate for America's renewed 
expectations.' 3 What the United States 
therefore expects is a more focused 
investment on crucial enablers and force 
multipliers, primarily through a 
reconciled force planning on 
expeditionary capabilities like those in 
the DC!. 
Operation Enduring Freedom energized 
U.S. expectations. The United States went 
to war in Afghanistan and left NATO 
behind because the European allies were 
unable to provide relevant forces at short 
notice to distant theatres. A DCI-related 
program that forged a realistic first step 
towards a small European expeditionary 
force structure should therefore he 
initiated. Too large a force could dilute the 
focus of the expectations and thus fail. 
Following Professor Stuart E. Johnson at 
the NDU, "our expeditionary initiative 
should be closely affiliated to existing U.S. 
concepts. It will have to include some U.S. 
participation because it cannot be seen as a 
de-Americanisation of NATO"." At the 
same time, however, most of the capability 
commitments would have to be assigned by 
a European "lead nation" -a dedicated 
member responsible for keeping momentum 
and focus on the specific project. This 
could be strategic sea-lift, air refuelling or 
secure communication. 
However, what would the United States 
expect in terms of national versus 
multinational funding? Following professor 
Johnson, some enabling equipment would 
best be provided by multinational consortia 
of NATO nations, or by common NATO 
funding. This could be AWACS, Air 
Ground Surveillance (AGS) Systems, 
strategic air transport or different 
configurations within communication and 
information systems." More importantly 
however, some key capabilities would 
depend on a transfer of U.S. technology, 
particularly within airborne ground 
surveillance, precision munitions and 
secure information sharing. This would 
have to be dealt with in the current 
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National Security Council technology 
transfer policy review." 
The U.S. initiative was finally called the 
Nato Response Force (NRF). Based upon 
recommendations from the INSS/NDU, the 
Pentagon officially presented its new 
initiative to the European Allies at the 
NATO Summit in Prague in November 
2002. According to U.S. Ambassador R. 
Nicholas Burns, the concept was 
expeditionary in character and design, and 
would be able to "deploy quickly wherever 
required to participate in the full spectrum 
of NATO missions" .'7 According to 
General James L. Jones, SACEUR, it was 
one of the most significant events in NATO 
since coming into existence in 1949." The 
expeditionary force concept would build 
upon a more focused DC! called the 
Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC). 
The PCC, also named "son of DC!", would 
be more focused and emphasise 
performance outputs through integrating 
various capabilities into a standing force 
structure. 89 
This would not only play a role in 
bridging the transatlantic capability gap. 
The capability commitments could also 
contribute to a stronger European voice 
in alliance deliberations. By integrating 
European capabilities to form a cohesive 
expeditionary team, European leverage 
would be more prominent, instead of 
contributing with small, fragmented 
capabilities to U.S.-Ied operations. 90 
Hence, creating a small bur potent pool 
of forces that could perform new 
missions outside the continent would 
require substantial European force 
integration: "Europe [could] not show up 
on the day of a conflict and expect to 
plug into U.S. battlefield operations".'" 
On the contrary, the NRF would have to 
consist of a fully operational command 
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structure with fully manned units that 
possessed necessary cohesiveness. From a 
U.S. perspective, only that way would 
NATO maintain its relevance in a new 
transatlantic partnership. 
Conclusion 
Which conclusions may be drawn 
regarding the United States' vision for a 
militarily more efficient Europe? 
Our first cone! usion is that the DC!, like 
other U.S. initiatives such as the PCC, the 
European Security and Defence Initiative 
(ESDI) and the Partnership for Peace (PfP), 
was aimed at controlling the scope and 
direction of the political and military 
development in Europe. More specifically, 
it can be claimed that through NATO, the 
United States affects Europe in a collective 
and legitimate way. While Europe binds 
her patron into a multilateral and 
institutional framework, the United States 
presents initiatives that received 
accommodation and sympathy. In sum, the 
U.S. transformation proposals affect the 
direction, tempo and outcome of Europe's 
military transformation. Asked if the DC! 
and the PCC could be seen as a U.S. 
instrument to promote national interests, 
Professor Kugler replied, "Of course, that 
is the underlying intent with the DC!- and 
by the way, it is also our duty! " 92 Former 
Assistant Secretary of Defense, Franklin D. 
Kramer, confirmed Professor Kugler's blunt 
remark, claiming that the DC!, despite its 
imperfectness, was designed to promote the 
U.S. interest of a militarily strong and 
relevant Europe. Only that way could the 
United States, by means of NATO, prevent 
a renationalisation of Europe's Armed 
Forces. 93 The validity of this conclusion is 
also enhanced by the overall assessment 
presented in the Pentagon's strategy 
Strengthening Transatlantic Sewrity: "The 
United States has a permanent and vital 
national interest in preserving the security 
of our European and Canadian Allies" .94 
By codifying an extensive list of capability 
criteria set forth in the DC! and agreed 
upon by the Heads of State at the NATO 
Summit in 1999, the United States defined 
decisive premises for Europe's 
transformation of Armed Forces. 
However, is it enough to suggest that 
U.S. initiatives on transformation, such as 
the DC! and the PCC, are a mere 
instrument for pursuing myopic self-
interest? May the U.S. proposals towards 
her partners in NATO also be regarded as 
friendly gestures, to help Europe? 
According to Senator Joseph R. Biden's 
(D) Senior Foreign Policy Advisor Michael 
Holtzel, U.S. initiatives on military 
transformation, such as the DC! and the 
PCC, should definitively be regarded in 
that way - as a friendly means to provide 
Europe with obstetric aid."' After all, the 
United States' European Allies struggled 
with a territorial-bound legacy that was 
quite different from the United States'. 
Apart from the terror attacks in 2001, the 
United States had not been at war on her 
own Continent since 1824 when the Royal 
Navy shelled Washington. Hence, as 
Senior Policy Advisor for the House 
International Committee John Lis claimed, 
by "helping Europe to help herselves", the 
United States would have a more confident 
partner, but also substantial influence on 
that partner's armed forces. 96 Professor 
Geir Lundestad at the Norwegian Nobel 
Institute may best describe this dualism: 
"Somehow Europe was to be both 
independent of and dependent on the 
United States at the same time" .97 
Furthermore, even though the ability to 
affect the European transformation 
through the DC! gradually lost momentum, 
we may nevertheless conclude that a new 
spirit of influence arose as the dust from 
the terrorist attacks in September 2001 
subsided. The fact that fighting 
international terrorism was perceived as a 
state of perpetual war may have validated 
U.S. capability efforts. In that context, U.S. 
leverage may have accelerated more 
comprehensively after "9.11.", despite the 
gradual insignificance of the DC!. Hence, 
in the context of a clarified threat 
perception from terrorism and WMD 
proliferators, influence from the DC! was 
refined into a more dedicated and specific 
U.S. initiative, the Prague Capability 
Commitment. 
Our second conclusion may substantiate 
the first one, claiming that U.S. leverage on 
European transformation is based upon the 
exportation of experiences and processes at 
home. As Captain Sam]. Tangredi pointed 
out, the DC! is a blueprint of the United 
States' leading intellectual manual for 
military transformation, the joint Vision 
2010 (]V 2010) and joint Vision2020 (]V 
2020).98 As both documents clarify the 
importance of dominant manoeuvre, 
precision engagement, focused logistics, 
and full dimensional protection," NATO's 
Heads of States concluded that similar 
principles should guide the Alliance as a 
means to strengthen European defence 
capabilities. 100 This should, according to 
the Summit Communique, be accomplished 
by emphasising the same characteristics as 
in }V 2010 and ]V 2020- although in a less 
militaristic expression, more in accordance 
with European preferences: improved 
deployability and mobility, better logistics, 
more effective engagement, and increased 
survivabiliry among Allied forces. 101 The 
similarity between }V 2010 and ]V 2020 
and the DC! thereby leads us to conclude 
that U.S. leverage is achieved by affecting 
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NATO members to adopt equivalent 
processes of military transformation. This 
is what Geir Lundestad calls "Empire by 
integration", in the way that Europe should 
become more efficient, which again could 
reduce the American burden in Europe. 102 
The impression that U.S. processes at 
home are projected to Europe through 
NATO may be even more validated as we 
move into the period after the '9.11 '.The 
U.S. push towards a more deployable and 
expeditionary force structure has strong 
resemblances with the defence strategy, as 
laid out in the latest Quadrennial Defense 
Report from the Pentagon in September 
2001. Capabilities aimed to fight 
international terrorism and WMD 
proliferators needed to be more flexible 
and responsive to the new global 
challenges. As a consequence, the QDR 
2001 shifted emphasis from waging two 
regional wars in the Persian Gulf and on 
Korean Peninsula respectively, towards a 
flexible structure that may be deployed 
anywhere at any time. This was deemed an 
operational necessity if action against 
terrorists and WMD proliferators should 
be successfully implemented. 103 We may 
argue that these sentiments have clear 
resonance to the NRF, which aims to meet 
the new threats from global terrorism. 
Our finding is neither controversial nor 
exceptional. Historically, the United States 
has always enjoyed great influence on how 
Europe should design her Armed Forces. 
NATO's strategy of Massive RetaliatiOil 
back in the 1950s was first formulated in 
the National Security Council document 
number 162/2 in October 1953. Thereafter, 
the concept became evident in NATO's 
Military Committee document number 48 
from December 1954. 104 As the Soviet 
Union gradually appeared as a credible 
nuclear power in the late 1950s, the 
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Americans pushed Europe to change 
towards Flexible Response, which finally 
was adopted by the North Atlantic Council 
in 1967 by MC 14/3.105 The present 
military transformation in Europe is as 
such a piece of continuity; the United 
States sets the agenda, Europe follows on. 
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